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Jay C. ~arl is le* 
During the 2000-2001 survey year, federal courts in the Second 
Circuit published approximately fifty personal jurisdiction opinions. 
The majority of the opinions handed down in federal district courts dealt 
with diversity matters and involved the application of New York State's 
long-arm statute.' There were, however, several significant circuit court 
opinions.2 One involved the district court's premature personal 
jurisdiction dismissal of a matter without consideration of whether the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") applied.3 Another 
involved a human rights claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the 
question of whether foreign companies were doing business in New 
York based on their maintenance of an Investors Relations Office in 
New York A third set forth important guidelines for a district 
court's rejection of a personal jurisdictional challenge,5 while another 
reminded the bench and bar that circuit court review of district court 
dismissals for want of personal jurisdiction are de n o ~ o . ~  
The district and circuit court opinions demonstrate that the bench 
* Professor of Law, Pace University Law School; Editor, Second Circuit Digest, 
1990-1994. 
1. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2001). C.P.L.R. 302 is New York's long- 
arm statute. It allows New York State courts to assert jurisdiction over non-domiciliary 
individuals and foreign corporations incapable of being served within the state, but 
having the contacts with the state that are listed in section 302. Such a defendant may 
be served outside the state as provided by C.P.L.R. 313. The personal jurisdiction 
obtained is limited by the terms of C.P.L.R. 302, as well as by constitutional 
considerations. C.P.L.R. 302 is a "restricted" long-arm statute, such that it does not go 
as far as is constitutionally permissible. 
2. See infra Part LI. 
3. Reiss v. Societe Centrale Du Groupe Des Assurances Nationales, 235 F.3d 
738, 747-48 (2d Cir. 2000). 
4. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1402 (2001). 
5. Fort Knox Music, Inc. v. Baptiste, 203 F.3d 193, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2000), 
vacated by 139 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
6. King v. Washington Adventist Hosp., No. 00-7320, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 
981, at *5 (2d Cir. Jan. 23,2001). 
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and bar of the Second Circuit devote an enormous amount of time to 
resolving jurisdictional disputes.7 They also indicate a lack of 
uniformity in applying concepts of personal juri~diction.~ Finally, they 
suggest that judges in the circuit are willing to apply New York7s long- 
arm statuteg to matters involving "jurisdictional contacts" based on 
telephones, fax machines, and web-sites.'' 
This Survey Article will review some of the district and circuit 
courts' significant decisions, and comment on future trends for 
application of the law of personal jurisdiction in the Second Circuit. 
The Article concludes with a recommendation that district court judges 
should not grant or deny personal jurisdiction defenses until at least 
limited jurisdictional discovery has been granted and is completed." 
Whether a federal court in the Second Circuit has personal 
jurisdiction over a given defendant in a diversity case, or in matters 
where there is no nationwide jurisdiction, is determined according to the 
law of the forum state.12 This involves a two-step inquiry. First, the 
court must consider the forum state's jurisdictional statutes, and, 
second, the court must consider and apply federal due process 
standards.13 These standards have been summarized by the Second 
7. See infra Parts 11, 111. 
8. See infra Part 111. 
9. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2001). 
10. See infra notes 106-126 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra Part IV. 
12. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing 
for lack of personal jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant 
committed a tortious act in New York, as required under the New York long-arm 
statute); A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that 
breach of contract for failure to perform financial services in New York was sufficient to 
subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute); 
Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that 
personal jurisdiction is "determined by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which 
the court sits"); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(holding that in diversity actions, jurisdiction is governedby the law of the state in 
which the court sits). See also King v. Washington Adventist Hosp., No. 00-7320, 2001 
U.S. App. LEXIS 981, at *4 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2001) (finding that federal courts must 
apply the personal jurisdiction laws of the forum state); Fort Knox Music, Inc. v. 
Baptiste, 203 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 2000), vacated by 139 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (stating that federal courts must apply the personal jurisdiction rules of the forum 
state). 
13. See cases cited supra note 12. 
Heinonline - -  21 QLR 16 2001-2003 
20011 PERSONAL JURISDICTION DEVELOPMENTS 
Circuit in Chew v. ~ i e t r i c h . ' ~  
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a state to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant with whom it has 
"certain minimum contacts. . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'. . . In 
determining whether minimum contacts exist, the court considers "the 
relationship among the defendant, the forum [state], and the litigation." . . . 
To establish the minimum contacts necessary to justify "specific" jurisdiction, 
[the plaintiff] first must show that [its] claim arises out of or relates to [the 
defendant's] contacts with [the forum state]. [The plaintiff] must also show 
that [the defendant] "purposefully availed [itself] of the privilege of doing 
business in [the forum state and that [the defendant] could foresee being 
"hailed into court" there. . . . 13 
The issue of personal jurisdiction must be determined separately 
for each cause of action asserted in the plaintiff's complaint.16 Also, 
Second Circuit Federal District Courts have considerable discretion in 
deciding a pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction." 
A court may determine the motion on the basis of affidavits alone, it 
may permit discovery in aid of the motion, or it may conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion.'' If the court does not conduct a full 
hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of 
jurisdiction; however, he must ultimately establish jurisdiction by a 
preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial hearing or at trial.19 In 
making the prima facie determination, the Second Circuit has held that 
courts should consider the pleadings and affidavits in the light most 
14. 143 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1998). 
15. Id.at28. 
16. See CIVIL PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK §§ 9-4 to 9-23 (Phillip M. 
Halpern & Jay C. Carlisle et al. eds., West Group 2000). 
17. See infra notes 18-2 1 and accompanying text. 
18. See Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(permitting extensive discovery into defendants' contacts with forum state); Bank 
Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(stating that a prima facie showing of jurisdiction can be satisfied with allegations in 
plaintiffs affidavits and supporting materials). Moreover, a court may consider matters 
outside the pleadings without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 
summary judgment. See Bank Brussels Lambert, 171 F.3d at 784. 
19. Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 196 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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favorable to the plaintiff.20 If no discovery has been conducted, the 
truth of the plaintiffs allegations will be assumed for purposes of the 
jurisdiction inquiry.2' 
Most Second Circuit 2000-2001 diversity in personam jurisdiction 
cases involve application of New York State law under principles of 
specific jurisdiction, pursuant to the New York Civil Practice Law and 
Rules 302 ("c.P.L.R.").~~ Several cases involve issues of general 
jurisdiction pursuant to C.P.L.R. 301.23 The important practical 
distinction between these two concepts is that, with the former, only the 
plaintiff's cause of action must arise from New York related a~t iv i t ies .~~ 
The question of whether there was proper notice of the commencement 
of the action is not discussed in this Survey. 
A. General Jurisdiction: C. P. L. R. 301 
The traditional basis for the exercise of jurisdiction that developed 
prior to the adoption of the C.P.L.R. was incorporated by C.P.L.R. 
3 0 1 . ~ ~  Thus, personal jurisdiction based on physical presence,26 
20. See Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 148 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating 
that a jurisdiction testing motion may be defeated by good faith allegations of 
jurisdiction). See also Ball, 902 F.2d at 197 (stating that "[alt [the] preliminary stage, 
the plaintiffs prima facie showing may be established solely by allegations[,]" however, 
"[alfter discovery, the plaintiffs prima facie showing . . . must include an averment of 
facts that, if credited by the trier, would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the 
defendant."). 
21. Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
1052 (2000). 
22. See, e.g., Photoactive Prods., Inc. v. Al-Or Int'l, Ltd., 99 F. Supp.' 2d 281, 287- 
88 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). The terms "general" and "specific" personal jurisdiction were 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Heliocopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.2 (1984). See also Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 42 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 343, 364-367 (1991) (describing reach of long-arm jurisdictiori under 
C.P.L.R. 302) [hereinafter Carlislel]; Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 39 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 75, 98-100 (1988) (discussing the basis for general jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 
301) [hereinafter Carlisle21. 
23. See Domond v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 368, 373 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting claim of general jurisdiction over defendant under a "doing 
business" theory); Ugalde v. DynaCorp, Inc., No. 98-Civ-5459, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1745, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2000) (explaining that plaintiff established a prima 
facie showing of personal jurisdiction over defendant under a "doing business" theory). 
24. Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 130 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Talbot 
v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 522 N.E.2d 1027, 1028-29 (N.Y. 1988) (discussing the 
"arising out of '  and "articuable nexus" requirements). 
25. See Carlislel, supra note 22, at 361-63. 
26. There are two exceptions to the presence requirement. First, a person is not 
deemed present in New York for purposes of service of process if he or she is induced to 
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domicile:' consent:8 or "doing business"29 permits New York courts to 
assert jurisdiction over a defendant for any cause of action irrespective 
of whether it arises from the defendant's contacts with New ~ o r k . ~ '  
The "doing business" concept is frequently used to obtain jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation. Although the New York Court of Appeals 
has stated that "the test for 'doing business' is and should be a simple 
and pragmatic one,"31 a review of the cases decided during the survey 
year indicates that the test, while pragmatic, is far from simple. 
B. Specific Jurisdiction: C. P. L. R. 302 
C.P.L.R. 302 permits New York courts to assert jurisdiction over 
non-domiciliary individuals and foreign corporations that are not subject 
to C.P.L.R. 301, but instead have the state contacts listed in C.P.L.R. 
3 0 2 . ~ ~  This long-arm statute is limited by the terms of C.P.L.R. 302, as 
well as by federal and state constitutional considerations, to claims that 
enter by fraud. Secondly, he or she is immune from process if he or she appeared 
voluntarily, as a plaintiff or defendant, to attend proceedings involving criminal or civil 
litigation. This immunity exception is not applicable if a person would be subject to 
long-arm jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302. Pavlo v. James, 437 F. Supp. 125, 127 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
27. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 313 (McKinney 2001) (stating that a New York domiciliary 
is subject to in personam jurisdiction on any claim, wherever it arises, and regardless of 
where the defendant is located at the time the summons is served). 
28. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 301 (McKinney 2001). In Dan-Dee International, Ltd. v. 
Kmart Corp., No. 99-Civ-11689, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1341 1, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
18, 2000), the court stated that a corporation "may be subjected to suit in New York 
under C.P.L.R. 301(a) only if the corporation has engaged in such a continuous and 
systematic course of 'doing business' . . . as to warrant a finding of its 'presence' in the 
jurisdiction." 
29. See Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(describing the "doing business" requirement as not occasionally or casually but with a 
degree of permanence); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 208 N.E.2d 439, 440 (N.Y. 
1965) (stating that maintaining an office in New York City indicates that the defendant 
is "doing business" in the state sufficient to subject him or her to jurisdiction). See 
generally Vincent Alexander, 'Doing Business' Jurisdiction: Some Unresolved Issues, 
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 19, 2001, at 3 (stating that "doing business" jurisdiction is well settled as 
a method of obtaining personal jurisdiction over an unlicensed foreign corporation). 
30. See Weissman v. Seiyu, Ltd., No. 98-Civ-6976,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 509, at 
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2000) (stating that "[a] cause of action arises out of a defendant's 
New York transaction when it is sufficiently related to the business transacted such that 
it would not be unfair to deem it to arise out of the transacted business"); Laufer v. 
Ostrow, 434 N.E.2d 692,694 (N.Y. 1982) (finding sufficient contacts within New York 
to be "considered systematic, regular[,] and continuous"). 
31. Bryant, 208 N.E.2d at 441. 
32. CIVIL PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK, supra note 16, at 9.5. 
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arise from the defendant's activity related to New ~ o r k . ~ ~  C.P.L.R. 
302(a)(l), covering tort, contract, and commercial matters, and C.P.L.R. 
302(a)(3)(ii), covering tort and commercial tort matters, were frequently 
analyzed by circuit court judges during the survey year.34 Other 
segments of the long-arm statute were seldom disc~ssed.~' 
II. SECOND CIRCUIT COURT CASES 
There were several significant Second Circuit personal jurisdiction 
cases published during the survey year. One unpublished decision was 
rendered. The first case is Reiss v. Societe Centrale Du Groupe Des 
Assurances ~ a t i o n a l e s , ~ ~  where the Second Circuit held that the trial 
court erred in deciding whether there was personal jurisdiction when it 
should have decided if the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applied. 
37 The second case is Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., where the 
Second Circuit found general jurisdiction, under C.P.L.R. 301, over a 
defendant who was doing business in New York through an Investors 
Relations Office. The third case is Fort Knox Music, Inc. v. ~ a ~ t i s t e , ~ ~  
where the Second Circuit held that the district court's failure to give a 
reason for rejecting defendant's challenge to personal jurisdiction 
precluded an appellate review on other issues raised. Finally, the 
unpublished opinion reminded the bar that circuit court review of 
personal jurisdiction issues are de n ~ v o . ~ ~  
A. The Reiss Case 
In Reiss, the plaintiff-appellant appealed from a judgment entered 
against him in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York by Judge Shira ~cheindlin.~' The judge dismissed his 
action to recover a finder's fee against defendants-appellees. The 
dismissal was based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, as well as for a 
failure to state a claim. The district court considered these objections 
33. Id. 
34. See infra notes 106-126 and accompanying text. 
35. No more than five cases per survey year discuss the "contracts anywhere" 
clause of C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1). 
36. 235 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000). 
37. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S .  Ct. 1402 (2001). 
38. 203 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2000), vacated by 139 F .  Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
39. King.v. Washington Adventist Hosp., No. 00-7320, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 
981, at *I (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2001). 
40. Reiss, 235 F.3d at 745. 
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before the completion of discovery and failed to recognize implications 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities ~ c t . ~ '  The court's 
jurisdictional analysis was based on C.P.L.R. 301 and C.P.L.R. 302. 
The court rejected the section 301 argument for personal jurisdiction 
through subsidiary activities for failure to allege "facts suggesting that 
the subsidiaries licensed in New York are agents or departments of any 
of the  defendant^.'^^ Also, the court rejected the section 302 argument 
on the grounds that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to prove 
that certain defendants had engaged in any activities that clothed them 
with the apparent authority to make a finder's fee agreement with the 
plaintiff.43 
The circuit court, speaking through Judge Roger Miner, first 
examined the question of whether the court had appellate jurisdiction 
over the appeal. Judge Miner noted, "Although neither briefed nor 
brought to our attention by the parties, the question arises from the fact 
that no final judgment ever was entered in this case."44 Judge Miner 
reasoned that the plaintiff-appellant meant to appeal from a final 
judgment on the date an opinion and order were entered, even though no 
formal judgment was entered. He then turned to the issue of in 
personam jurisdiction and found error in the analysis undertaken by the 
district court. He stated: 
The initial question to be answered in this case is not whether there is personal 
jurisdiction within the meaning of the New York Civil Practice Law and 
Rules, but whether there is subject matter jurisdiction within the meaning of 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities . . . . 45 
Judge Miner reasoned that, constrained by constitutional due 
process considerations, personal jurisdiction under the FSIA equals 
subject matter jurisdiction plus valid service of process. He noted that 
the district court had failed to address the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction and that the parties had failed to include the actual moving 
papers thereto in the appendix. Judge Miner, in a thoughtful analysis of 
the FSIA, concluded that the district court's premature jurisdictional 
4 1. Id. at 746. 
42. Id. at 744 (quoting Reiss v. GAN, S.A., 78 F. Supp. 2d 147, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
43. Id. 
44. Reiss, 235 F.3d at 745. 
45. Id. at 746. Judge Miner reasoned, "[Slubject matter jurisdiction under the 
FSIA, an issue apparently presented to the district court but not addressed by it, must be 
the object of our inquiry here." Id. 
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dismissal prevented the parties from presenting evidentiary material at a 
hearing on the question of FSIA jurisdiction. Judge Miner instructed 
the district court to afford broad latitude to both sides in this regard and 
to resolve the disputed factual matters by issuing findings of fact.46 
The Second Circuit's decision in the Reiss case was issued on 
December 27,2000. It reminds the bar once again of the "hazards of an 
incomplete appendix."47 It also reminds federal district court judges 
that there are different burdens and standards to apply with respect to 
personal jurisdiction defenses made before and after discovery is 
completed. In fact, what may appear to be an issue of personal 
jurisdiction may involve issues of subject matter jurisdiction. 
B. The Wiwa Case 
In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum CO.;~  two foreign holding 
companies were sued by Nigerian CrnigrCs under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act ("ATCA"), alleging human right violations. The companies moved 
to dismiss. The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, by Judge Kimba Wood, found that there was personal 
jurisdiction, but dismissed the action on forum non conveniens grounds. 
The Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Pierre Leval, held that 
there was general jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 301, therefore, the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens did not apply. 
The plaintiffs' complaint alleging that they and their next of kin 
were imprisoned, tortured, and killed by the Nigerian government, in 
violation of the law of nations, at the instigation of the defendants, in 
reprisal for their political opposition to the defendants' oil exploration 
activities. The complaint alleged that the Shell Nigeria Company had 
coercively appropriated land for oil development without adequate 
compensation, and caused substantial pollution of the air and water in 
46. Id. at 747. Judge Miner stated: 
We think it is essential for the district court to afford the parties the opportunity to 
present evidentiary material at a hearing on the question of FSIA jurisdiction. The 
district court should afford broad latitude to both sides in this regard and resolve 
disputed factual matters by issuing findings of fact. 
Reiss, 235 F.3d at 747. 
47. Id. at 746 (citing Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 407 (3d 
Cir. 1980)). Judge Miner reminded the bar that "[tlhe parties seem to agree in their 
briefs that the issue was presented but the absence of the actual moving papers in the 
appendix impels us to warn the bar once again of the hazards of an incomplete 
appendix." Id. 
48. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1402 (2001). 
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the homeland of the plaintiffs. 
Defendants' only contacts with New York were their New York 
Stock Exchange listings and their maintenance of an Investor Relations 
Office in New York On appeal, the defendants made four 
arguments: ( I )  these activities were not attributable to the defendants for 
jurisdictional purposes; (2) these New York activities cannot be 
considered in the jurisdictional calculus because they were merely 
incidental to a stock market listing, and were jurisdictionally 
inconsequential as a matter of law; (3) the investor relations activities 
were legally insufficient to confer general jurisdiction; and (4) 
exercising jurisdiction over the defendants would violate the fairness 
requirement of the Due Process Clause. The circuit court rejected each 
of these contentions and held that the defendants were subject to 
personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York. 
Judge Leval reviewed the requirements for general jurisdiction in 
the Second Circuit under C.P.L.R. 301. He explained that "doing 
business" concepts in New York State permit a court to assert 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when it affiliates itself with a 
New York representative entity. Further, New York representatives 
render services on behalf of the foreign corporation that go beyond mere 
solicitation, and are sufficiently important to the foreign entity, in that 
the corporation itself would perform equivalent services if no agent 
were available. He then stated, "Both Magistrate Judge Pitman and 
Judge Wood found that Graspi and the Investor Relations Office were 
agents of the defendants for jurisdictional purposes. We agreev5' 
Judge Leval rejected the defendants' arguments that there was not an 
agency relationship. He reasoned that the Investor Relations Office, 
while not directly involved with the core functions of the defendants' 
business, was of "meaningful importance to the  defendant^."^' Thus, he 
49. Id. at 93. Judge Leval stated: 
While nominally a part of Shell Oil, Grapsi and the Investor Relations Office 
devoted one hundred percent of their time to the defendants' business. Their sole 
business function was to perform investor relations services on the defendants' 
behalf. The defendants fully funded the expenses of the Investor Relations Office 
(including salary, rent, electricity, mailing costs, etc.), and Grapsi sought the 
defendants' approval on important decisions. 
Id. at 95-96. 
50. Id. at 95. 
51. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 96. Judge Leval's "meaningful importance to the 
defendants" test significantly expands the Frummer/Gelfand test. Judge Leval 
implicitly accepted the defendants' argument that the Investors Relations Office was not 
essential for operation of the defendants' business in New York, but found the office 
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placed less emphasis on the Frummer/Gelfand "but for test,"52 focusing 
on a pragmatic "facilitation" test which stressed the volume and value of 
the defendants' New York contacts in terms of constitutional 
considerations of due process-forseeability and fairness. 
Judge Leval also relied on New York's traditional set of indicia for 
assertion of general jurisdiction under the C.P.L.R. His examples 
included 
whether the company has an office in the state, whether it has any bank 
accounts or other property in the state, whether it has a phone listing in the 
state, whether it does public relations work there, and whether it has 
53 individuals permanently located in the state to promote its interests. 
He also noted that "[tlhe Investor Relations Office, whose 
activities are attributable to the defendants under the Frummer analysis, 
meets each of these tests. It constitutes a substantial 'physical corporate 
presence' in the [sltate, permanently dedicated to promoting the 
defendants'  interest^."^^ 
Finally, Judge Leval rejected the defendants' argument that it 
would violate the fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause for a 
New York court to exercise jurisdiction over them. Citing Keman v. 
Kurz-Hustings, ~nc.?' he set forth a two-part test for asserting personal 
jurisdiction: "the [sltate's laws authorize service of process upon the 
defendant and an assertion of jurisdiction under the circumstances of the 
case comports with the requirements of due process."56 Judge Leval 
stated: 
The required due process inquiry itself has two parts: whether a defendant has 
"minimum contacts" with the forum state and whether the assertion of 
jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice-that is whether. . . [the exercise of jurisdiction] is reasonable under 
the circumstances of a particular case. 57 
important to the maintenance of good relationships with existing investors and potential 
investors. The defendants also argued that if they were to perform the investor relations 
services themselves, it would not necessarily be in New York. Judge Leval rejected this 
argument as extremely weak. Id. 
52. Id. at 98. 
53. Id. (citations omitted). 
54. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 98 (citations omitted). 
55. 175 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 1999). 
56. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 99. 
57. Id. (quoting Chaiken v. VV Publ'g Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1027 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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Judge Leval explained that "once a plaintiff has made a 'threshold 
showing' of minimum contacts, the defendant must come forward with 
a 'compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would 
render jurisdiction unreasonable. "'" Judge Leva1 admitted that there 
were certain factors favoring jurisdictional dismissal but reasoned that 
"[tlhe defendants control a vast, wealthy, and far-flung business empire 
which operates in most parts of the globe."59 He stated: 
[The defendants] have a physical presence in the forum state, have access to 
enormous resources, face little or no language barrier, have litigated in this 
country on previous occasions, have a four-decade long relationship with one 
of the nation's leading law firms, and are the parent companies of one of 
American's largest corporations, which has a very significant presence in New 
York. New York City, furthermore, where the trial would be held, is a major 
world capital which offers central location, easy access, and extensive 
facilities of all kinds.60 
For similar reasons, the Second Circuit reversed Judge Wood's 
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, holding that the case 
should be heard in the Southern District of New ~ o r k . ~ '  The Second 
Circuit's decision in Wiwa would please Justice Brennan and others 
who advocate a flexible and pragmatic approach in the application of 
personal jurisdiction principles. 
- 
58. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560 
(2d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59. Id. 
60. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 99. Judge Leval pointed out that the grant or denial of a 
motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens is generally committed to the district 
court's discretion. The deference accorded to the district court presupposes, however, 
that the court used "the correct standards prescribed by the governing rule of law." Id. 
(citing Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
Judge Leval stated: 
We believe that, as a matter of law, in balancing the competing interests, the 
district court did not accord proper significance to a choice of forum by lawful 
[United States] resident plaintiffs or to the policy interest implicit in our federal 
statutory law in providing a forum for adjudication of claims of violations of the 
law of nations. 
Id. 
61. Id.at108. 
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C. The Fort Knox Music, Inc. Case 
In Fort Knox Music, Inc. v. ~ a ~ t i s t e , 6 ~  copyright holders brought 
an action for a declaratory judgment under the Copyright Act over 
ownership of the well-known song, the "Sea of Love." They sought a 
declaration that a songwriter was time-barred from commencing any 
action against them challenging their rights and copyright in a musical 
composition. The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, in a decision by Judge John E. Sprizzo, granted a 
judgment on the pleadings for the plaintiffs, but denied their request for 
attorneys' fees. The defendant had moved to dismiss the complaint 
based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. Judge Sprizzo held a hearing 
on the defendant's motion to dismiss, allowing him to argue by 
telephone from Louisiana. The court then denied the motion, stating 
"that for the reasons set forth on the [rlecord at [olral [alrgument, 
defendant pro se's motion to quash service of the summons and to 
dismiss the complaint is denied."63 
On appeal, the Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Amelia 
Kearse, noted that the issues of personal jurisdiction must be resolved 
prior to reaching either the merits of the case, or plaintiffs' cross-appeal 
from the denial of attorneys' fees. She explained that since the 
Copyright Act did not provide for nationwide service of process, the 
federal court must apply the forum state's-New York-personal 
jurisdiction rules. Judge Kearse reviewed decisions under New York's 
long-arm statute and stated, "In order to determine whether a party has 
'transacted business' in New York, a court must look to the totality of 
circumstances concerning the party's connections to the state."64 
Judge Kearse then explained: 
In the present case, plaintiffs urged upon the district court various bases for 
the assumption of personal jurisdiction over Baptiste. The court plainly 
rejected Baptiste's jurisdictional challenge, but the record does not reveal the 
ground of that rejection. Because the absence of an explanation prevents 
meaningful appellate review, we remand the matter to the district court for 
supplementation of the record with a statement of the factual and doctrinal 
62. 203 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2000), vacated by 139 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
63. Id. at 195-96. 
64. Id. at 1%. 
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grounds for the court's ruling on personal jurisdiction. 65 
D. The King Case 
In King v. Washington Adventist ~ o s ~ i t a l , ~ ~  the Second Circuit 
issued an unpublished opinion affirming the dismissal of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York by Judge 
Carol Bagley Amon. 
In March of 1999, plaintiff King filed a Section 1983 action on 
behalf of himself, his wife, and his daughter. The complaint related to 
events that took place at the Montgomery Mall in Bethesda, Maryland. 
The circuit court pointed out that a review of the district court's 
dismissal was de novo. The court noted that because Section 1983 did 
not establish a grant of nationwide jurisdiction, federal courts hearing 
such claims must apply the rules of personal jurisdiction that govern the 
state in which the court sits. The circuit court found absolutely no 
grounds upon which the plaintiff had presented any facts sufficient to 
sustain an exercise of personal jurisdiction under the law of New York 
State. Thus, the district court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was affirmed. 
A. General Jurisdiction: C. P. L. R. 301 
Federal district courts in the Second Circuit issued at least eleven 
opinions which analyzed and applied New York's general jurisdiction 
statute, C.P.L.R. 301.~' Three themes emerge from these cases. First, if 
65. Id. at 197. 
66. No. 00-7320,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 981, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 23,2001). 
67. See infra notes 72-97 and accompanying text. See also Armstrong v. Virgin 
Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that general 
jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 301 existed over defendants subject to their right to renew 
jurisdictional objections after completion of discovery); Shaheen Sports, Inc. v. Asia 
Ins. Co., Ltd., 89 F. Supp. 2d 500,503 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs made 
a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction pursuant to C.P.L.R. 301); United 
Mizrahi Bank, Ltd. v. Sullivan, No. 97-Civ-9282, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16157, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2000) (stating that the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to find 
that defendants were "doing business" under C.P.L.R. 301); Clay Paky, S.p.A. v. Vari- 
Lite, Inc., Nos. 99-Civ-11401, 99-Civ-11402, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9802, at *19-20 
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2000) (finding that the defendant was subject to general jurisdiction 
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a non-domiciliary corporate defendant is not licensed to do business in 
New York, but maintains an office with employees who solicit business 
in the state, use bank accounts, and have other property in the state, 
general jurisdiction exists.68 Second, some courts focus less on the 
traditional quantity of doing business contacts, but, rather, focus more 
on the quality and value of those contachb9 Third, cases in which a 
corporate defendant acts through a third party have caused some 
diffi~ulties.~' When the entity not only serves the defendant's interests, 
but performs activities which are essential to the defendant's operations, 
the defendant may be deemed to be doing business in New York, but 
only if an inference of agency exists. In this respect, jurisdictional 
discovery will be granted if the plaintiff has alleged a prima facie case 
of personal juri~diction.~' 
1. Theme Z 
One example of the first theme is GMAC Commercial Credit, 
72 L. L. C. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., where the district court, by 
Judge Constance Baker Motley, held that personal jurisdiction existed 
under the "doing business" provision of C.P.L.R. 301. Judge Motley 
stressed that the non-domiciliary corporate defendant admitted that it 
maintained an office and place of business in New York. She also noted 
the defendant was involved in an action against it in a New York State 
court and that the defendant derived income from its activities in New 
York. Judge Motley explained that the defendant's New York contacts 
were continuous and systematic so that it was fair to presume a 
corporate presence.73 Another example of the first theme is Gamarra v. 
in New York under the "doing business" provision of C.P.L.R. 301); Ugalde v. 
DynaCorp, Inc., No. 98-Civ-5459, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1745, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
23, 2000) (stating that defendants were subject to general jurisdiction in New York 
under the "doing business" provision of C.P.L.R. 301). 
68. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. 
69. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
70. See infra notes 82-97 and accompanying text. 
71. Id. 
72. 198 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
73. Id. at 406. Judge Motley stated: 
Defendant, in its verified answer to the complaint in the state action, admits to 
maintaining an office and place of business at that address in New York. Based 
upon this admission, this court finds that defendant is "doing business" in New 
York for the purposes of satisfying C.P.L.R. 301 and that defendant's contacts with 
New York are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. 
Id. 
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Alamo Rent-A-Car, ~ n c . , ~ ~  where the district court, by Judge John 
Elfvin, held that there was no personal jurisdiction under the "doing 
business" provision of C.P.L.R. 3 0 1 . ~ ~  Judge Elfvin stated: 
Given that defendants Horan or Cooze are not domiciliaries of New York and 
otherwise have no physical presence in the United States, do not own any 
property in New York[,] and have not engaged in any activities in New York 
which might qualify them as doing business within the meaning of C.P.L.R. 
301, there is no basis on which this c ourt may, under such section, exercise $2 personal jurisdiction over defendants. 
2. Theme 11 
One example of the second theme is Photoactive Productions, Inc. 
v. AL-OR International, ~ t d . , ~ ~  where the district court, by Judge Arthur 
Spatt, held that a manufacturer was engaged in a continuous and 
systematic course of doing business in New York so as to warrant a 
finding of its presence in New York for purposes of general jurisdiction 
under C.P.L.R. 301. The defendant argued that it had "no offices, 
warehouses, employees[,] or residences within New ~ o r k . " ~ *  Also, the 
defendant claimed it did not maintain any officers, agents, or business 
representatives in New York; did not own any real or personal property 
in New York; and did not maintain any telephone numbers or directory 
listings in New York. Its primary contacts with the Empire State were 
solicitations by way of telephone contact from La Jolla, ~ a l i f o r n i a . ~ ~  
Finally, the defendant argued that sales of its products to retailers within 
74. No. 99-Civ-411,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1146, at *I (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 4,2001). 
75. Id. at *2. Plaintiff commenced his action in the New York State Supreme 
Court, Erie County, seeking redress for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile 
accident that occurred in the Province of Ontario, Canada. The action was removed on 
diversity of citizenship grounds to the federal district court. Id. 
76. Id. at *5. The district court also rejected personal jurisdiction on C.P.L.R. 302 
grounds because any alleged tortious conduct and its resulting injury occurred in 
Canada. Gamarra, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1146, at *5. 
77. 99 F. Supp. 2d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
78. Id. at 285. 
79. Id. The defendant also argued, "New York is an inconvenient forum because 
all the evidence, documents, witnesses[,] and principals are located in California." Id. 
In addition, defendant claimed that none of its employees or representatives had ever 
traveled to New York to negotiate, discuss, or enter into a contract with the plaintiff. 
Hence, the defendant argued it did "not have sufficient minimum contacts with New 
York to justify a finding of [personal] jurisdiction in the Eastern District of New York." 
Photoactive Prods., Inc., 99 F.  Supp. 2d at 285. 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  2 1  QLR 29 2001-2003 
New York represented only three to five percent of its total sales. 
Judge Spatt recognized that the defendant's solicitation of business 
alone could not justify a finding of presence in New York pursuant to 
C.P.L.R. 301. Nonetheless, relying on A.I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra 
~ a n k , ~ '  he explained that, in the context of a motion to dismiss, he must 
view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. He then stated: 
[Tlhe [clourt notes that the plaintiff has made a [prim facie] showing of 
jurisdiction by alleging that AL-OR solicits business in New York; advertises 
in New York; conducts a large number of sales in New York; and receives 
considerable revenue from sales in New York. 8 1 
Judge Spatt focused on the fact that the defendant's advertising 
schedule contemplated expenditures of more than $650,000 in New 
York for 1999. This jurisdictional analysis is practical and pragmatic. 
It avoids reliance on the traditional factors for a finding of general 
jurisdiction, and it focuses on the benefits the non-domiciliary defendant 
receives from New York. If the benefits are substantial, it is fair and 
reasonable for the defendant to expect to be hailed into New York to 
defend the lawsuit. 
3. Theme III 
Several cases illustrate the third theme. In Damn v. Marriott 
International Hotels, 1nc.,8' the plaintiff octogenarian sought to recover 
five million dollars in damages for personal injuries she suffered upon 
exiting an unleveled elevator located in the Budapest Marriott Hotel. 
The complaint gave rise to a "spate of defensive motions," one of 
which, by Otis Felvono ("OF"), was to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
by Judge Charles Haight, stated, "The [clourt will first consider the 
threshold question of whether this [clourt has personal jurisdiction over 
 OF."^^ Judge Haight explained that the plaintiff had not alleged that OF 
directly conducted business in New York within the meaning of 
C.P.L.R. 301; however, under New York law, jurisdiction could be 
obtained over a foreign company if it is a "mere department" of an 
80. 989 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1993). 
81. Photoactive Prods., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 288. 
82. No. 99-Civ-10496, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 642, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 
2001). 
83. Id. at *8. 
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entity that is present in New ~ o r k . ~  Since the plaintiff had alleged the 
inference of an agency,85 Judge Haight reviewed the Second Circuit's 
requirements. 
In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft, . . . the [clourt 
announced the factors to consider in determining whether to assert jurisdiction 
over a related foreign corporation. The "essential factor," which by itself is 
not determinative is common ownership. . . . Here it is uncontested that OF is 
wholly owned by OE. . . . Three other factors to consider are the financial 
dependency of the subsidiary on the parent, the degree to which the parent 
interferes in personnel and fails to observe corporate formalities, and the 
degree of control over marketing and operations by the parent over the 
subsidiary. . . . 86 
In response to OF's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff submitted 
pages from www.otis.com, a web-site of OF's parent corporation, which 
was doing business in New York. The web-site advertised that the 
parent had employees in 1700 worldwide locations, that eighty percent 
of its employees were non-Americans, and that eighty percent of its 
revenues were generated abroad. Judge Haight held that the facts 
recited on the parent's corporate web-site raised legitimate questions as 
to the level of control exercised by the parent with respect to OF, and, 
further, that the questions raised by the Beech factors should be 
addressed after discovery had occurred. Accordingly, the district court 
allowed the plaintiff limited discovery to ascertain the jurisdictional 
facts necessary to establish whether the court had general personal 
jurisdiction over OF, pursuant to C.P.L.R. 301.~' 
It is questionable whether Dorfman had shown a prima facie case 
of personal jurisdiction, which the Second Circuit requires prior to 
granting jurisdictional discovery. 
In Aerotel, Ltd. v. Sprint corp.,8* the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, by Judge Shira Scheindlin, held 
that if evidence existed that a nonresident defendant corporation and its 
84. Id. 
85. Id.at*lO-11. 
86. Dorfman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 642, at * l l  (citations omitted). Judge Haight 
stated, "Where a plaintiff must, as here, establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the court is wise to allow this discovery." Id. at *14 (citing Filus v. Lot 
Polish Airlines, 907 F.2d 1328, 1332 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
87. Id. See also Sideman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 713 
(9th Cir. 1992) (finding that "where pertinent facts bearing on the question of 
jurisdiction are in dispute, discovery should be allowed."). 
88. 100 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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resident subsidiaries shared overlapping management, though 
insufficient to pierce the corporate veil and establish the court's 
personal jurisdiction over the parent, it was sufficient to avoid pretrial 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Scheindlin stated: 
Prior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may 
defeat the motion by pleading in good faith, . . . legally sufficient allegations 
of jurisdiction. At that preliminary stage, the plaintiffs prima facie showing 
may be established solely by allegations. After discovery, the plaintiffs 
prima facie showing necessary to defeat a jurisdiction testing motion, must 
include an averment of facts that, if credited by the trier, would suffice to 
establish jurisdiction over the defendant. At that point the prima facie 
89 
showing must be factually supported. 
Two district court opinions illustrate how difficult the Beech four- 
part test is to apply. In Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A, 
~ o n s o l i d a t e d ~ ~  the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, by Judge Michael Mukasey, dismissed a class action suit 
against twenty European insurance companies for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, and denied plaintiffs motion for jurisdictional discovery.9' 
First, Judge Mukasey referred to the four factors in Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschafr v. Beech ~ircraft?' and explained that it was the 
parent corporation who was doing business in New York, which the 
plaintiff sought to impute to the subsidiary. Judge Mukasey found a 
parentlsubsidiary relationship was not enough for an assertion of general 
jurisdiction. Absent an agency relationship, which Judge Mukasey held 
did not exist, there was no general jurisdiction. Judge Mukasey also 
denied plaintiffs' requests for jurisdictional discovery. He relied on 
89. Id. at 194. 
90. Nos. 97-Civ-2262, 98-Civ-9186, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11991, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,2000). 
91. Id. at *4-5. Judge Mukasey explained that the plaintiffs' complaint stated, 
without any supporting facts, that the defendants participated in a multinational 
insurance arrangement within the state of New York. He reasoned that these legal 
conclusions presented as factual allegations were not facts and could not substitute for 
facts. Judge Mukasey noted that conclusory non-fact-specific jurisdictional allegations 
were not sufficient to establish even a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction 
under C.P.L.R. 301. Id. 
92. 751 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1984). Beech set out four factors: (1) common 
ownership, which is essential; (2) financial dependency of the subsidiary on the parent 
corporation; (3) the degree to which the parent corporation interferes in the selection and 
assignment of the subsidiary's executive personnel and fails to observe corporate 
formalities; and (4) the degree of control over the marketing and operational policies of 
the subsidiary exercised by the parent. Id. at 120-22. 
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Jazini v. Nissan Motor co .y3  for the rule that if the plaintiffs did not 
establish a prima facie case showing that the district court had 
jurisdiction over the defendant, the court would not err in denying 
discovery on that issue.94 
In Jerge v. pottery5 the United States District Court for the 
Western District of New York rejected plaintiff's argument that a 
subsidiary doing business in New York could be imputed to its parent 
corporation. The court analyzed the four factors derived from Beech, 
concluding that the Second Circuit's requirement that accounting 
principles require parent corporations to consolidate financial statements 
if the parent corporation owns more than fifty percent of a subsidiary's 
stock meant the consolidation was non-dispositive of the jurisdictional 
issue.96 The court also pointed out that having common directors and 
officers is a normal business practice of a multinational corporation, and 
absent complete control, there is no justification to labeling a subsidiary 
a mere department of the parent corp~ration.~' 
B. Long-arm Jurisdiction: C. P. L.R. 302 
I .  Initial Observations 
Federal district courts in the Second Circuit issued approximately 
fifty opinions analyzing and applying New York's long-arm statute- 
C.P.L.R. 3 0 2 . ~ ~  In about one-half of the opinions, federal district court 
93. 148 F.3d 18 1 (2d Cir. 1998). 
94. Id. at 186. 
95. No. 99-CV-03 12E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 1648, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 
2000). 
96. Id. at *3. 
97. Id. at *4. 
98. See In re Surnitomo Copper Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(stating that under New York's long-arm statute, the court had specific personal 
jurisdiction over officers and directors of broker in RICO action); Mario Valente 
Collezioni, Ltd. v. Confezioni Semeraro Paolo, 115 F. Supp. 2d 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (finding that long-arm jurisdiction exists under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l)'s "contracts 
anywhere" clause); Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, No. 99-Civ-11480, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11516, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000) (finding that long-arm jurisdiction in 
intellectual property cases exists under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l)); Credit Suisse First Boston 
Corp. v. Continental Sav. Bank, No. 99-(3-2792, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 793, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2000) (holding that a commercial tort did not occur within New York 
for purposes of C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) jurisdiction); Weissman v. Seiyu, Ltd., No. 98-Civ- 
6976,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 509, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18,2000) (holding that long-arm 
jurisdiction exists because of the activities of defendant's agents in New York State). 
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judges found personal jurisdi~tion.~~ In the other half of the opinions, 
they found no personal jurisdiction.loO A review of these survey year 
cases indicates that the district courts have focused almost exclusively 
on C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l)'s "transaction of business" contract and tort 
cases, and on C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) tort matters.''' A review of the 
cases reveals several interesting trends. 
First, in diversity cases and in matters where there is no nationwide 
jurisdiction, a federal district court must determine if personal 
jurisdiction exists based on the law of the forum state. Every survey 
case referred to in this Article is from a New York Federal District 
Court. The majority of these opinions rely almost exclusively on other 
federal opinions interpreting New York State substantive law. There is 
little direct reference to recent personal jurisdiction decisions by New 
York State appellate courts. New York's long-arm statute is restricted 
and does not go as far as is constitutionally permissible. In addition to 
being constrained by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it is also restricted by Article I, Section six, of the New 
York State Constitution. Federal district court judges who fail to rely on 
See also Plunket v. Doyle, No. 99-Civ-11006, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2001, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001) (finding that a dispute over works of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, 
author of the Sherlock Holmes stories, did not fit within C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii), 
therefore, jurisdictional discovery denied, but the plaintiff was given an opportunity to 
replead, and if sufficient facts were plead, then limited jurisdictional discovery would be 
permitted); Arista Tech, Inc. v. Little Enters., 125 F. Supp. 2d 641,651 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(stating that there was no long-arm jurisdiction because of plaintiffs failure to allege 
tortious acts outside New York, as required by C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii)); Domond v. Great 
Am. Recreation, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 368, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that a New 
Jersey amusement park owner was not subject to long-arm jurisdiction in a personal 
injury action because C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l) and 302(a)(3)(ii) requirements not satisfied); 
Maldonado v. Rogers, 99 F. Supp. 2d 235,238 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no jurisdiction 
under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) when accident occurred outside New York; although 
plaintiff suffered consequences of injuries in New York); Best Cellars, Inc. v. Grape 
Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431,444 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that in a federal 
question case, personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants was determined by 
looking to law of jurisdiction in which federal court sits; long-arm jurisdiction existed 
under subsection (a)(l), but not under (a)(3) of C.P.L.R.); Banicade Books, Inc. v. 
Langberg, No. 95-Civ-8906, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18279, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 
2000) (finding no long-arm jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l) or (a)(2); however, 
C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) requirements satisfied); Cornell v. Assicurazioni General, S.p.A., 
Consol., No. 97-Civ-2262,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11004, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7,2000) 
(finding that the plaintiff failed to show long-arm jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l), 
and did not allege facts sufficient to warrant limited jurisdictional discovery). 
99. See cases cited supra note 98. 
100. See cases cited supra note 98. 
101. See cases cited supra note 98. 
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recent state appellate decisions may not be complying with the spirit of 
the Second Circuit's ruling in Arrowsmith v. United Press 
~nternational,'~~ and its progeny. lo3 
Second, if a personal jurisdiction objection is made by a defendant, 
it is clear that the plaintiff need only initially make a prima facie 
showing of jurisdiction. Although the district court can decide the 
motion on affidavits alone, some courts permit jurisdictional discovery. 
In a majority of the personal jurisdiction district court cases, decisions 
were made without the benefit of discovery. This is unfair, particularly 
when the plaintiff has requested jurisdictional discovery. Also, district 
court judges do not request sua sponte that parties engage in 
jurisdictional discovery. Jurisdictional discovery enables the plaintiff to 
gather information to assist him in meeting his ultimate burden-to 
establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial 
hearing or at trial. The standards used for determining if plaintiffs have 
made out a prima facie case for purposes of obtaining discovery vary in 
the circuit. Some district court judges are more willing to permit 
jurisdictional discovery than others. This lack of uniformity is unfair. It 
leads to increased appellate burdens on the Second Circuit. Also, it is 
well-known that a favorable jurisdictional decision for a plaintiff is 
tantamount to a favorable settlement. What settles before one district 
court judge may be appealed, dropped, or settled for less before another 
district court judge. 
Third, there are at least fifteen district court decisions where long- 
arm jurisdiction is based on phone calls, faxes, and web-sites.Io4 These 
decisions indicate an increase in the judicial business of Second Circuit 
102. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). 
103. See cases cited supra note 12. 
104. See infra notes 106-126 and accompanying text. See also Telebyte, Inc. v. 
Kendaco, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating web-site not 
sufficient for personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l), (a)(2), or (a)(3)); On Line 
Mktg., Inc. v. Norm Thompson Outfitters, Inc., No. 99-Civ-10411, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 95036, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2000) (finding telephone and fax contacts with 
New York insufficient for long-arm jurisdiction); Nader v. Getshaw, No. 99-Civ-11556, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14308, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000) (finding no C.P.L.R. 
302(a)(l) or (a)(3) long-arm jurisdiction because telephone and mail contacts of 
defendant were not sufficient for purposes of statute); Stewart v. Vista Point Verlag & 
Ringier Publ'g Co., No. 99-Civ-4225, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14236, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 29, 2000) (stating that a web-site is not sufficient for purposes of long-arm 
jurisdiction, therefore, jurisdictional discovery denied); Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., No. 
00-CV-243, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9533, at *I (S.D.N.Y. July 1 I ,  2000) (stating web- 
site not sufficient for long-arm jurisdiction). 
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courts. Few of these cases are filed in New York State courts.'05 
Finally, two district court cases involve the application of sanctions and 
the law of res judicata. 
2. Cases Highlighted 
In Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl ~ o r n ~ a n i e s , ' ~ ~  the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, by 
Judge Denny Chin, held that the court had personal jurisdiction over an 
internet registrant. The defendant was a California domiciliary who had 
diluted a trademark by registering the mark as an internet domain name 
and telephoning the holder in New York with an offer to sell the domain 
name rights. Judge Chin found personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 
302(a)(3)(ii). Judge Chin pointed out that the plaintiff had alleged that 
the defendant committed a tortious act outside the state 
("cybersquatting") that caused injury to the plaintiff within the state. In 
addition, the defendant expected or reasonably should have expected his 
actions to have consequences in New York, and he derived substantial 
revenue from interstate or international commerce. "He had a web-site 
offering domain names for sale and he in fact sold two domain 
names."lo7 Judge Chin also concluded that the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant would not violate the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution. He stated, "Storey [the defendant] 
purposefully availed himself of the benefits of doing business in New 
York. He telephoned Cello [the plaintiffl twice and sent an e-mail to 
Cornell, and thus he 'reached out' and 'originated' contacts with New 
york."lo8 
In Mason Tayler Medical Products Corp. v Qwikstrip Products, 
105. This Survey author has lectured annually since 1989 on personal jurisdiction 
before the New York State Trial Lawyers Institute and notes that most of the recent fax, 
phone, and web-site jurisdiction reported cases are in federal court. For an instructive 
and scholarly review of the issues, see Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96-Civ-3620, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (discussing long-arm 
jurisdiction based on nonresident's internet contacts with New York). 
106. 89 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
107. Id. at 470. 
108. Id. At all pertinent times, for purposes of considering whether personal 
jurisdiction existed, Storey was a citizen and resident of California. He never resided in, 
or had been a citizen of, New York. He never owned any real property, or maintained 
any offices, bank accounts, or telephone listings in New York. He had not personally 
visited New York in almost thirty years. After registering his domain name, however, 
Storey sent electronic mail messages to at least nine individuals or companies he had 
targeted to sell items. Id. 
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L.L.c.,"~ the United States District Court for the Western District of 
New York, by Judge John Elfvin, found that the defendant transacted 
business in New York under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l) by making telephone, 
fax, and internet contacts to the Empire State. He reminded the bar that 
the New York long-arm statute is a single contact statute and that so 
long as the relevant cause of action arises from the contact there is 
jurisdiction. Judge Elfvin also reminded the bar, "It is well settled that a 
defendant need not be physically present in New York to be found to 
have transacted business here. ,9110 Similarly, in Toledo Peoria & 
11 1 Western Railway Corp. v. Southern Illinois Railcar Co., the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of New York, by Judge 
Kahn, held that a defendant's renewal of lease terms via telephone and 
facsimile communications constituted sufficient contact with New York 
to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction of the court. Judge 
Kahn stated, "[Ilt is also clear that the physical presence, in this cellular 
and digital age, is not necessary. The substance of those 
communications dominates, not their quantity or form."112 
Judge Kahn qualified his opinion by noting that, despite modern 
advances in technology, jurisdiction "conveys a sense of limits and 
boundaries of the appropriate balance between states and the federal 
government dictated by federalism. 3,113 This is a position which the 
United States Supreme Court, arguably, repudiated long ago.l14 
115 In Haddad Brothers, Inc. v. Little Things Mean A Lot, Inc., the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, by 
Judge Alan Schwartz, held that personal jurisdiction existed over a Utah 
corporation engaged in the business of producing, marketing, and 
selling various lines of christening clothing for babies. Judge Schwartz 
found general jurisdiction but stated, "Even if the 'doing business' test 
were not applicable here, the court would still have jurisdiction over 
109. No. 99-CV-0177E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5170, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 
2000). 
1 10. Id. at *4. 
1 1 1 .  84 F. Supp. 2d 340 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
112. Id.at343. 
113. Id. 
114. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702 n.10 (1982). The Due Process Clause itself makes no mention of federalism 
concerns. "Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an independent 
restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the 
personal jurisdiction requirement." Id. 
115. No. 00-Civ-0578, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11035, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 
2000). 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  2 1  QLR 37 2001-2003 
Little Things under New York's long-arm statute."'I6 Key to this 
conclusion was the fact that the defendant's online store also offered 
products to New York ~ustorners.''~ Similarly, in Cable News Network, 
L.P. v. Gosms.Com, Inc.,"* the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, by Lawrence McKenna, held that the 
defendant was subject to long-arm jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 
302(a)(3)(ii). With respect to the expectation requirement of the long- 
arm statute, Judge McKenna stressed that the defendant had used mobile 
telephone service for its worldwide market. This was sufficient under 
the Second Circuit's Kerman v. Kurz-Hustings, Inc.'19 rule, to satisfy the 
statutory requirements. 
An instructive web-site case is Hsin Ten Enterprise, USA, Inc. v. 
Clark ~ n t e r ~ r i s e s , ' ~ ~  where the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, by Judge Shira Scheindlin, thoughtfully 
analyzed the question of when web-site contacts are sufficient for 
jurisdiction purposes.'2' The judge pointed out that the Second Circuit 
has made it clear that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is not 
appropriate simply because the defendant maintains a web-site, which 
residents of New York may visit. Rather, Judge Scheindlin stated, 
"[C]ourts must examine the nature and quality of commercial activity 
that an entity conducts over the internet."'22 
Judge Scheindlin reminded the bar that courts considering the issue 
of the amount of internet activity sufficient to trigger personal 
jurisdiction must examine a number of facts.'23 First, at the lower end 
of the spectrum are passive web-sites, which primarily make 
information available to viewers but do not permit an exchange of 
inf~rmation. '~~ Such web-sites do not confer personal jurisdiction. 
Judge Scheindlin expanded: 
At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which the defendant clearly does 
business over the internet, such as where it repeatedly transmits computer files 
116. Id. at *5. 
1 1  7. Id. at *4. 
118. No. 00-Civ-4812, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16156, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 
2000). 
119. 175 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 1999). 
120. No. 00-Civ-5878, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18717, at * I  (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 
2000). 
121. Id. at *11-15. 
122. Id. at *13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
123. Id. 
124. Clark Enters., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187 17, at "14. 
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to customers in other states. . . . Occupying the middle ground are 
'interactive' web-sites, which permit the exchange of information between the 
defendant and web-site viewers. . . . Generally, an interactive web-site 
supports a finding of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 125 
Judge Scheindlin found C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l) "transaction of 
business" specific jurisdiction because "Clark's [wleb-sites enabled the 
viewer to purchase the [elxercise [mlachine online, download an order 
form, download an application to become an 'independent affiliate,' and 
ask questions of an online representative. At the very least, the [wleb- 
,3126 sites are highly interactive. The court concluded that the "arising out 
of '  requirement was satisfied, and that there were minimum contacts for 
purposes of satisfying the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 
3. Final Cases 
a. Rule 11 
In Roberts-Gordon, L.L.C. v. Superior Radiant Products, ~ t d . , ' ~ ~  
the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, 
by Judge Richard Acara, held that sanctions could not be imposed on an 
Ontario manufacturer for challenging jurisdiction. 
The plaintiff moved for sanctions against the defendant, arguing 
that its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was 
predicated on false and misleading statements contained in an affidavit 
that it submitted. The plaintiff argued that the affidavit falsely stated 
that the defendant had no end-user customers in New York State, that 
defendant's New York distributors were not authorized to contract on 
behalf of the company, and generally denied that the defendant had 
sufficient contacts with New York to entertain j~risdicti0n.l~~ 
Judge Acara, who adopted a report from Magistrate Judge Leslie 
Foschio, reminded the bar that Rule 11 sanctions are to be imposed 
when it appears that a competent attorney could not form the requisite 
reasonable belief as to the validity of what is asserted in a pleading or 
motion. He also stated, "A violation of Rule 11 requiring the imposition 
of sanctions occurs where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely 
125. Id. at *14-15. 
126. Id. 
127. 85 F. Supp. 2d 202 (2d Cir. 2000). 
128. Id. at 219. 
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no chance of success. . . . A subjective claim of good faith does not 
provide a 'safe harbor' from the threat of this rule."'29 Judge Acara then 
found that sanctions were not warranted because the record supported a 
finding that the motion was not frivolous when made as the complaint 
alluded to jurisdiction based on the presence of the defendant's 
interactive web-site and distributors in New york.l3' 
b. Res Judicata 
The final survey year case is 1 Five 0, Inc. v. A. ~chulman,'~'  
where the United States District Court for the Western District of New 
York, by Judge John Elfvin, held that a state court ruling regarding 
personal jurisdiction was binding on the defendant. The plaintiff had 
filed a state court action and later moved to strike the defendant's 
jurisdictional defenses. The Supreme Court of New York denied the 
plaintiff's motion to strike and specifically held that the plaintiff had 
failed to establish that the defendant had minimum contacts with New 
York under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l). The parties later entered into a 
stipulation to discontinue that suit without prejudice to 
recommencement in a court of proper jurisdiction. On the same day, 
plaintiff commenced his federal 1 a ~ s u i t . l ~ ~  
The defendant moved to dismiss the federal claims on the grounds 
of issue preclusion~ollatera1 estoppel-arguing that the issue of 
personal jurisdiction was adequately litigated and adjudicated in the 
prior state proceeding. The plaintiff argued that because the state court 
ruling was not dispositive of the state action on jurisdictional grounds, it 
was not binding on the district court. The plaintiff had not been given 
an opportunity to litigate whether jurisdiction existed under C.P.L.R. 
302(a)(2) or (a)(3).133 
Judge Elfvin noted that federal courts must give to a prior state 
court decision the same preclusive effect, either claim preclusion or 
issue preclusion, that the courts of New York would give to it. He then 
reviewed the narrow doctrine of issue preclusion as applied in state 
courts, and concluded that it should be applied. Judge Elfvin 
disregarded plaintiffs argument that the state court had not considered 
-- - 
129. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
130. Id. 
131. No. 99-Civ-0354E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7938, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 
2000). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at *2. 
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whether jurisdiction existed under C.P.L.R. 302 (a)(2) or (a)(3).'34 The 
result confuses claim preclusion with issue preclusion. The fact that the 
state court judge made a jurisdictional determination solely based on 
C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l) should not preclude the plaintiff from relitigating the 
issue of personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) or (a)(3). 
This year's Survey on personal jurisdiction cases demonstrates that 
the judges of the Second Circuit devote an enormous amount of their 
valuable time to questions of whether they have power over non- 
domiciliary defendants. One can only speculate as to how many of the 
district court opinions discussed in the Survey will be appealed to the 
Second Circuit. The nation's federal appellate courts' dockets are 
crowded. Federal district court judges should require at least limited 
jurisdictional discovery prior to granting or denying personal 
jurisdiction defenses. Discovery is required because the plaintiff must 
ultimately establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence and 
because facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are usually in 
dispute. 
134. Id. 
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